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Abstract
There has perhaps been no issue as contentious in Covid-19 as face masks. The most contentious scientific debate has been 
between those who argue that “there is no scientific evidence”, by which they mean that there are no randomized controlled 
trials (RCTs), versus those who argue that when the evidence is considered together, “the science supports that face cover-
ings save lives”. It used to be a ‘given’ that to decide whether a particular factor, either exogenous or endogenous, can cause 
a particular disease, and in what order of magnitude, one should consider all reasonably cogent evidence. This approach 
is being increasingly challenged, both scientifically and politically. The scientific challenge has come from methodologic 
views that focus on the randomized controlled trial (RCT) as the scientific gold standard, with priority being given, either to 
evidence from RCTs or to observational studies which closely mimic RCTs. The political challenge has come from various 
interests calling for the exclusion of epidemiological evidence from consideration by regulatory and advisory committees.
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Introduction
There has perhaps been no issue as contentious in Covid-19 
as face masks. Their benefits and drawbacks are endlessly 
debated politically, and scientifically. The most contentious 
scientific debate has been between those who argue that 
“there is no scientific evidence”, by which they actually 
mean that there are no randomized controlled trails (RCTs), 
vs. those who argue that, admittedly, there is no single defin-
itive study, but when the evidence is considered together, 
“the science supports that face coverings save lives” [1]. 
Advocates of the latter approach would argue that there is 
also no RCT evidence that parachutes save lives [2], but 
that there is a strong hunch based on knowledge of humans 
falling from altitudes.
It used to be a ‘given’ that to decide whether a particular 
factor, either exogenous or endogenous, can cause a particu-
lar disease, and in what order of magnitude, one should con-
sider all reasonably cogent evidence: several types of epi-
demiologic studies, clinical studies, laboratory studies, and 
sometimes socio-economic studies. This approach is being 
increasingly challenged. The scientific challenge has come 
from methodologic views that focus on the randomized con-
trolled trial (RCT) as the scientific gold standard. However, 
the form of the argument has changed over time. In particu-
lar, we can distinguish between an earlier phase when the 
main distinction (as drawn, for example, by the Cochrane 
Collaboration [3], and Evidence-Based Medicine [4]) was 
between RCTs and observational studies, and more recent 
developments where a distinction has been drawn between 
observational studies conducted using an RCT paradigm 
with the intention of mimicking a ‘target trial’ (e.g. causal 
inference methods [5]), and other observational studies [6].
The political challenge has come from various interests, 
skilfully employing calls for ‘greater accountability in sci-
ence’ [7]. This has been particularly motivated by anti-reg-
ulation “vested interests” which have disputed a long series 
of scientific discoveries, ranging from smoking and lung 
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cancer to the reality of climate change [8–10]. Recently, 
these pressures have led to calls for the exclusion of epide-
miological evidence from consideration by regulatory and 
advisory committees, thereby weakening regulatory stand-
ards [11]. For example, a recent appointee to the EPA Clean 
Air Scientific Advisory Committee argued that “rather than 
relying on the weight-of-evidence approach that the EPA has 
traditionally used to infer causation, [the Clean Air Science 
Advisory Committee] wants to rely on studies that use… 
‘manipulative causality’”. This restricts acceptable evidence 
to assess causality to results from RCTs or observational 
studies on interventions that were analysed with the use of 
causal inference statistical methods [11]. Similar views have 
been expressed at high levels of the current British Govern-
ment [12].
Evidence synthesis
Evidence synthesis may include systematic reviews or for-
mal meta-analyses of the findings of observational studies 
and/or RCTs, but it usually also incorporates other types of 
evidence, e.g. animal studies and laboratory science. Several 
key considerations for adjudicating causality were proposed 
by Bradford Hill in 1965 [13]: Strength; Consistency; Speci-
ficity; Temporality; Biological gradient; Plausibility; Coher-
ence; Experiment; and Analogy. Bradford Hill stresses that 
these are considerations rather than criteria, and that no sin-
gle consideration is essential for causality to be inferred, but 
they do provide a framework for the synthesis of available 
evidence. Since 1972, the International Agency for Research 
on Cancer (IARC) Monographs provide a model for a sys-
tematic approach to combine evidence from human, animal 
and mechanistic studies to classify various exposures with 
regards to carcinogenicity.
In such approaches, inferring causality involves the 
synthesis of a variety of evidence, and no single study is 
definitive [13], not even a randomized trial. In fact, many 
important questions cannot be studied by RCTs (think of 
environmental, occupational effects, but also long-term 
adverse effects of medical therapies), not all RCTs are done 
well, and the interpretation of whether they are also involves 
judgment.
An integrative view of evidence synthesis that has come 
under renewed attention recently is named ‘triangulation’ 
[14]. It explores various potential biases by comparing 
studies and populations where the hypothetical biases are 
likely to be in different directions. If the studies tend to be 
concordant regarding the observed association, especially 
if their different potential biases are in opposite directions, 
this supports a causal interpretation. Importantly, this is in 
contrast to standard meta-analysis which aims at finding 
and combining similar studies to reach one overall estimate, 
Triangulation focusses on identifying different study types 
and different populations in which one would expect the 
biases to be different and in different directions, so that the 
likely strength of the hypothesized biases can be assessed.
Triangulation strategies include cross-context compari-
sons, use of different control groups, natural experiments, 
within-sibling comparisons, natural experiments, instru-
mental variable (IV) analyses, Mendelian Randomization 
(MR), exposure-negative controls, and outcome-negative 
controls. Other non-RCT-based methods include popula-
tion comparisons, difference in difference, and regression 
discontinuity studies [15]. Of course, some specific studies 
may carry greater weight than others, but this is highly topic 
and context-specific.
Thus, traditional approaches to evidence synthesis, 
including triangulation of evidence, are pluralistic and 
inclusive, with all of the relevant evidence being considered. 
For example, in the IARC Monographs on carcinogenicity, 
laboratory and animal studies are playing an increasingly 
important role, next to human data [16].
The challenge arising from translating 
theories about the superiority of RCTs 
and ‘causal inference’, into scoring systems
Both phases in the debates about the RCT being the gold 
standard, have led to the development of scoring systems 
for evidence.
The older view from the Evidence-Based Medicine move-
ment prioritized RCTs for medical decision making, in an 
iconic ‘pyramid of evidence’ with the RCT on top, followed 
at some large distance by observational cohort studies and 
at even further distance for other types of observational 
studies. This thinking was crystallised in scoring systems 
like GRADE that in practice are completely geared towards 
RCTs; they will only ‘upgrade’ observational studies if there 
is evidence of ‘reverse confounding’, or if the effect is huge 
[17]. This pyramid may be useful for certain medical deci-
sions, e.g., about drugs with small benefits. However, it has 
been argued repeatedly how this it fails for other types of 
medical and public health knowledge [18–20].
One recent controversy [21] involved an analysis of 
studies of processed and red meat. This used the GRADE 
criteria to exclude virtually all of the observational study 
evidence, leaving only two intervention studies; however, 
these intervention studies were of rather debatable relevance 
because of their short follow-up and uncertainty of the dif-
ference between people with different dietary habits [22–24]. 
In contrast, the Working Group of the IARC Monographs 
considered all of the available evidence, and concluded that 
the evidence for an increased risk of colorectal cancer was 
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convincing for processed meat and probable also for red 
meat [25]. In the integrative approach to evidence synthe-
sis, the maxim is that all studies have potential limitations, 
but that one should carefully look and judge each limitation 
and whether it can be overcome by other studies or other 
types of evidence.
In recent years a ‘causal inference’ theory has increas-
ingly promoted a distinction within observational studies, 
based on the idea an RCT is the gold standard for research 
involving exposures and outcomes in humans. Thus, when 
we cannot perform an RCT, the next best option is to per-
form an observational study which closely mimics the RCT 
model [26]. This has led to new scoring systems such as 
ROBINS-I, ROBINS-E [27, 28]. We have argued elsewhere 
[29], that this ‘mimic the RCT approach’ limits epidemio-
logic research to ‘events’ or interventions and ignores other 
types of evidence, e.g. time trends or ecological comparisons 
may make an important contribution to evidence synthesis. 
More specifically, a scoring system demanding an RCT-
like framework for observational studies also downgrades 
events/interventions that are not followed from initiation of 
exposure onwards. Elsewhere, it has been argued why the 
latter would a priori downgrade long-term epidemiologic 
studies on smoking, occupational and environmental health 
[6, 30]. Moreover, causal inference theory not only excludes 
(or strongly downgrades) much useful evidence; it is also 
‘politically conservative’ as it cannot envisage interventions 
on societies to reduce social inequalities, or on the planet, as 
are needed for climate change [31].
Nevertheless, the RCT-paradigm has become increasingly 
dominant in epidemiological theory in recent years [29]. 
The zenith (or nadir, depending on your point of view) of 
this approach, has been the development of scoring systems 
which are used to assess individual studies, and score them 
according to whether they are RCTs, or score them relative 
to the ‘gold standard’ of a hypothetical RCT. Such scoring 
systems result in many thoughtfully executed observational 
studies being scored as ‘low quality’, and being effectively 
excluded from consideration, even though they may be very 
illuminating when considered together with other studies. 
The present Covid-19 epidemic is a case in point: all actions 
to mitigate the spread of the epidemic are based on (admit-
tedly partial) understanding of this particular type of virus 
transmission, insights about the viral genome, modelling 
of observational data of counts and rates, and comparisons 
between actions of regions or countries.
The challenge from vested interests
Traditional approaches to evidence synthesis, much 
like any science, from astronomy to physics, inevitably 
involve subjective judgements at the forefront of scientific 
developments, e.g. when comparing the findings of stud-
ies which used different designs, which were conducted 
in different populations, or when comparing and synthe-
sizing epidemiological, clinical, animal, and mechanistic 
evidence. It should be emphasized that equally subjective 
judgments can play a role in accepting or not accepting the 
results of RCTs—think of all debates about the validity 
of RCTs organized by the pharmaceutical industry which 
makes the medications that they put themselves on trial.
Integrative considerations such as exemplified by those 
of Bradford Hill, as well as those used on a regular basis 
nowadays by IARC, provide a powerful guide of how to 
synthesize different types of evidence. Of course, deci-
sion-making processes may vary depending on the urgency 
of the issue (e.g. Covid-19), and the consequences to indi-
viduals and to the public health of an incorrect decision 
[32]. Nevertheless, these considerations play their part in 
a context where it is increasingly common for decisions 
of regulatory committees to be challenged, or for different 
committees to reach different conclusions on the basis of 
the same set of evidence. This has left regulatory bod-
ies open to legal challenge, which have been increased 
by recent political developments that resulted in greater 
representation of vested interests on regulatory matters 
[7]. In turn, such regulatory bodies have an understandable 
desire for a more transparent decision-making process, to 
protect themselves from litigation. Thus, having a clear set 
of rules (no matter how simplistic), may be seen as more 
convenient politically and legally, in comparison with the 
standard scientific decision-making process which inevi-
tably involves judgements [33].
To placate legal and vested interests, it looks as if an 
easy solution is at hand, in that there is now a ready-made 
methodological view which explicitly argues that RCT-
type evidence is the gold standard, and other observational 
evidence is of doubtful, if any, validity. Moreover, there 
are now readily available tools (GRADE, ROBINS-I, etc.) 
which can be used to score individual studies on humans, 
clinical as well as epidemiological, on this basis. Such 
scoring systems have a veneer of objectivity, or at least 
provide a clear ‘paper trail’ so that regulatory authorities 
can more transparently report how decisions were made.
The quote from the recent appointee to the EPA Clean 
Air Scientific Advisory Committee that we mentioned 
speaks for itself. It prefers a theory that restricts numeri-
cal evidence to intervention studies or analyses with the 
use of causal inference statistical methods [11].
We want to emphasize that, despite the disturbing 
aspects of these developments, we are not arguing that 
there is any direct connection between modern causal 
inference theory and attempts to influence evidence syn-
thesis by vested interests. However, both reinforce each 
other’s tendency to restrict the ‘acceptable evidence’ to 
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studies which are RCTs, or observational studies which 
closely mimic RCTs. All other relevant evidence from 
individual studies (triangulation, time trends, animal stud-
ies, mechanistic studies) does not fit this paradigm, and 
such studies are either rejected or scored so low that they 
are ignored [34].
What is to be done?
Covid-19 has, within nine months, provided a ‘fast forward’ 
version of ‘normal science’ in which decisions need to be 
made quickly, lives are at stake, and one cannot wait for the 
perfect study. This does not mean that standard RCTs are 
not important—on the contrary, the trials of dexamethasone, 
chloroquine, and vaccines illustrate their crucial role, but it 
means that there are many important issues about curtail-
ing the epidemic for which trials are neither possible, nor 
required. One example is the acceptance of the cumulative 
effect of barrier methods and screening to break the chain 
of transmission, whether they are mouth masks or rapid 
tests—based on insight and modelling, rather than RCTs or 
RCT-like observational studies [1].
The way ahead is advocated by Savitz et al. [35] who 
argue that risk of bias assessments should focus on iden-
tifying a (small) number of the most likely influential 
sources of bias, classifying each study on how effectively 
it has addressed each potential bias, and then determining 
whether results differ across studies in relation to suscepti-
bility to each hypothesized source of bias. For example, if 
non-differential misclassification of exposure (which usually 
produces a bias towards the null) is likely to be a problem in 
some studies, but if these studies all yield similar positive 
findings, and other studies with likely less misclassification 
of exposure yield even stronger positive findings, then mis-
classification of exposure is unlikely to explain the findings 
of the former studies.
Algorithm-based methods such as GRADE and ROB-
INS-I that rely on the RCT paradigm are just a part of the 
toolkit of methods that can be used for evidence synthesis. 
When used carefully, they may assist the assessment of pos-
sible biases in studies of some particular exposure-outcome 
associations. For example, being able to group studies as 
to the likely occurrence, direction and strength of residual 
confounding, may provide a useful knowledge base for tri-
angulation, and for the approach advocated by Savitz et al. 
[35]. However, when these scores are used inappropriately to 
score individual studies, and to reject standard observational 
evidence on the basis of such scores, these algorithm-based 
systems have considerable potential for harm, both to sci-
ence and to the health of the public.
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